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THE NEW EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION ACT: THE FUNCTIONALITY 
AND CONSTITUTIONALITY OF BIOMETRICS IN THE HIRING PROCESS 
GRAYSON COLT HOLMES 
In 1990, Congress created the U.S. Commission on Immigration 
Reform to assess and make recommendations regarding the 
implementation and impact of U.S. immigration policy.  Unanimously, the 
Commission proposed employment-based immigration reforms that have 
lead to the creation of E-Verify, an Internet-based electronic verification 
system used by employers to verify a prospective worker’s eligibility.  
Today, the system compares a prospective worker’s identification 
information, such as her name, date of birth, and social security number 
with information contained in databases housed by the Department of 
Homeland Security and Social Security Administration.  Several members 
of Congress, however, have proposed legislation that would require 
prospective workers to submit biometric information to curb identity fraud 
and existing shortfalls in the verification process.   
This Note examines the practical and legal implications of a nationally 
mandated biometric verification system and whether such a system is 
constitutionally viable under current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  
Ultimately this Note argues that no matter how unsettling the collection of 
biometric information by the government may be, at least in the 
employment hiring context, a nationally mandated biometric verification 
system will most likely pass constitutional muster.  
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THE NEW EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION ACT: THE FUNCTIONALITY 
AND CONSTITUTIONALITY OF BIOMETRICS IN THE HIRING PROCESS 
GRAYSON COLT HOLMES* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In April 2009, in an effort to prevent illegal immigrants from obtaining 
employment in the United States, six congressional legislators unveiled a 
plan to require prospective workers to submit biometric information 
through a national employment verification program.1  The bill, which 
today remains in committee, threatens to foist a technology on American 
workers and employers that many have only seen in the movies.  If the bill 
is passed, employers who use the verification system would collect from 
prospective workers not only social security numbers, birth certificates, 
and I-91 forms, but also biometric identification images of fingerprints, 
irises, and faces.  A nationally mandated system that collects this 
information raises a host of legal questions, including whether such a 
requirement constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment, and 
whether such a system would unduly violate societal expectations of 
privacy.  
This Note addresses common misperceptions and legal concerns about 
such a nationally mandated system and examines whether such a system 
could work in practice and under existing Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence.  Part II of this Note delves into the history of employment 
verification in the United States and Congress’s struggle to find the perfect 
automated system.  Part III surveys the federal government’s biometric 
activities since the September 11th terrorists attacks and evaluates current 
technological capabilities.  Part IV explores the Fourth Amendment and 
privacy implications of a biometric requirement in a national employment 
verification program.  Finally, the Note concludes that a biometric 
requirement has the potential to meet congressional immigration goals 
without impinging on the rights of prospective workers, but it cannot exist 
until the government strengthens existing departmental structures and 
allocates new resources for a national employment verification system. 
The stigma attached to the government’s recording of bodily 
                                                                                                                          
* University of Georgia, A.B. 2007; University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D Candidate 
2011.  I would like to thank Professor Kaaryn Gustafson for her insightful comments and guidance 
during the creation of this Note. I would also like to thank the members of the Connecticut Law Review 
for their keen eyes during the editing process, especially Ashley Schaefer for her encouragement and 
advice.  This note is dedicated to my great-grandfather, the late Harold J. Smith.  All errors are mine 
and mine alone.  
1 H.R. 2028, 111th Cong. (2009). 
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information is enormous.  This Note’s purpose is not to remove that 
stigma.  Rather, it attempts to quell privacy and Fourth Amendment 
concerns that may arise from the use of existing biometric technology in 
the prospective worker-employer context.  Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence and societal expectations of privacy continually change with 
the needs of the public interest and developments in technology.  This Note 
attempts to reconcile those competing interests and argues that a national 
employee verification system that extracts biometric information is 
constitutionally viable. 
II.  EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION IN AMERICA 
A.  The Evolution of Electronic Eligibility Verification Systems 
In 1990, Congress authorized a bipartisan commission, known as the 
U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform (Immigration Reform 
Commission), to evaluate the implementation and impact of U.S. 
immigration policy.2  The Immigration Reform Commission first pitched 
the idea of a national electronic eligibility verification (EEV) system in a 
report to Congress in 1994.3  The report noted that the promise of 
employment in the United States serves as one of the strongest attractions 
drawing many illegal immigrants to the country.4  Past “open borders” 
immigration policies had encouraged, according to libertarian critics, 
undocumented immigrants to come to the United States to seek education 
and employment.5  Likewise, segments of the U.S. economy have and still 
rely heavily on immigrants to perform tasks that many American workers 
were reluctant to perform.6   
                                                                                                                          
2 Congress mandated the Immigration Reform Commission through the Immigration Act of 1990.  
The Act charged the Immigration Reform Commission to release two reports—an interim report in 
1994 and a final report in 1997—detailing major immigration-related issues facing the United States. 
Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–649, § 141(a)–(b), 104 Stat. 4978, 5001–02 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); U.S. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, 1994 EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY i (1994).  
3 See DORIS MEISSNER & MARC R. ROSENBLUM, MIGRATION POLICY INST., THE NEXT 
GENERATION OF E-VERIFY: GETTING EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION RIGHT 4 (2009) (stating that the 
U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform recommended that Congress create an electronic eligibility 
verification system to end document fraud); U.S. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, supra note 2, at 
xiii–xviii (explaining the benefits of a computerized verification system and the proposed features of a 
pilot program). 
4 U.S. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, supra note 2, at xii (stating the need to decrease the 
employment magnet).  
5 See Jim Harper, Electronic Employment Eligibility Verification: Franz Kafka’s Solution to 
Illegal Immigration, 612 CATO INST. POL’Y ANALYSIS 1, 4 (2008), available at 
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=9256 (explaining the “open borders” policy during the 
early part of American history and how Congress passed legislation encouraging immigration to 
overcome the labor shortage caused by the Civil War).  
6 See, e.g., PARR ROSSON ET AL., NAT’L MILK PRODUCERS FED’N, THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF 
IMMIGRATION ON U.S. DAIRY FARMS 2 (2009), available at http://nmpf.org/latest-news/press-
releases/jun-2009/nmpf-study-finds-dairy-farms-rely-heavily-on-foreign-workers (stating that dairy 
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The Immigration Reform Commission noted that one goal that should 
underpin any successful national immigration policy is “reducing the 
employment magnet.”7  To this end, the Immigration Reform Commission 
recommended a national program that hinged its success on worksite and 
employer enforcement.  The recommended plan called for employers to 
leverage a computerized national identity verification program to curb 
identity fraud, while the federal government would ensure employer 
compliance through the imposition of penalties and fines for employers 
who employed unauthorized workers.8  
In response to the Immigration Reform Commission’s report, Congress 
created three electronic verification pilot programs to test the effectiveness 
of a national EEV system in which employers could voluntarily enroll.9  It 
charged the Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) and Social 
Security Administration (SSA) with the task of commencing the three 
programs, and all three were fully implemented by 1997.10  Of the three 
programs, the “Basic Pilot” (renamed “E-Verify”) proved the most 
                                                                                                                          
farmers employ 57,000 foreign-born immigrants or forty-one percent of their workforce and that 
eliminating immigrant labor would reduce the U.S. dairy herd by 1.34 million head, reduce milk 
production by 29.5 billion pounds, and reduce the number of dairy farms by 4,532, increasing milk 
prices by about sixty-one percent).  But see STEVEN A. CAMAROTA & KAREN JENSENIUS, CTR. FOR 
IMMIGRATION STUDIES, JOBS AMERICANS WON’T DO?: A DETAILED LOOK AT IMMIGRANT 
EMPLOYMENT BY OCCUPATION 1–2 (2009), available at http://www.cis.org/illegalimmigration-
employment (stating that a 2005–2007 survey found that there were only a small number of majority-
immigrant occupations and that immigrants do not take jobs Americans want). 
7 U.S. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, supra note 2, at xii; see also Save America 
Comprehensive Immigration Act of 2007: Hearing on H.R. 750 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, 
Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec., and Int’l Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 187 
(2007) (statement of T.J. Bonner, National President, National Border Patrol Council of the American 
Federation of Government Employees AFL-CIO) (stating that proposed solutions have failed to curb 
illegal immigration because they have not “reduced the employment magnet”).  Notably, only one 
federal court has acknowledged the “employment magnet” that Congress has “endeavored to turn-off.”  
See Am. Friends Serv. Comm. v. Thornburgh, 718 F. Supp. 820, 822–23 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (deferring to 
the government’s overriding interest in immigration control and upholding sanctions against an 
employer who knowingly employed an illegal alien because reversing sanctions would “reactivat[e] the 
employment ‘magnet’”). 
8 U.S. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, supra note 2, at xiii–xiv, xix–xx. 
9 MEISSNER & ROSENBLUM, supra note 3, at 4; Harper, supra note 5, at 5.  These three programs 
are the Citizen Attestation Verification Pilot Program (CAVPP), the Machine-Readable Document 
Pilot Program (MRDPP), and the Basic Pilot Program (E-Verify).  Id. at 5.  The blueprints for each 
plan were laid out in Title IV of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996.  Pub. L. 104-208, §§ 401−05, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 655−66 (1996) (codified at 8 USC § 1324a et 
seq.). 
10 Lindsay L. Chichester & Gregory P. Adams, The State of E-Verify: What Every Employer 
Should Know, 56 FED. LAW., July 2009, at 50, 50.  CAVPP allowed workers to attest to their 
citizenship status, which was then electronically checked against information in INS databases.  
Unsurprisingly, ineligible workers attested to being citizens, and many employers rarely sought out 
fraud.  Some employers, however, discriminated against work-authorized noncitizens because of the 
liability risks associated with the worker’s presence.  MRDPP was initiated in Iowa because of the 
state’s machine-readable driver’s licenses and ID cards.  The program suffered from technical 
difficulties in reading the IDs and was undermined by the state’s transition away from using SSNs on 
driver’s licenses.  Both CAVPP and MRDPP were terminated by the Department of Homeland Security 
in 2003.  Harper, supra note 5, at 5. 
 678 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:673 
successful and is the current model of success for Congress’s national 
immigration reform campaign.11   
E-Verify was first implemented in the five states that Commission 
officials said “had the highest estimated numbers of undocumented 
immigrants: California, Florida, Illinois, New York, and Texas.”12  
Employers in those states were not required to use the system, but instead 
voluntarily registered to participate.13  Two years later, the program 
expanded to include Nebraska.14  By 2003, E-Verify had expanded to all 
fifty states and the two other pilot programs had been discontinued.15  
Although the INS initially oversaw E-Verify’s implementation, it was 
reconfigured in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, and the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) and the SSA currently operate E-Verify’s 
internet-based database.16 
E-Verify works by checking information—name, date of birth, social 
security number (SSN) and, for non-citizens, alien identification number—
provided to the employer by the prospective worker.17  Employers must 
“submit this information through a secure website within three days after 
[the] worker is hired.”18  The program then checks the worker-provided 
information against the SSA’s main database, called “Numident,” if she is 
a citizen, or, if she is a noncitizen, against the DHS composite system, 
called the “Verification Information System” or “VIS.”19  If the worker’s 
information matches the records on either Numident or VIS, E-Verify 
returns a confirmation to the employer through the website, and the worker 
is cleared to work.20  When the information cannot be verified through the 
database, E-Verify responds with a tentative non-confirmation (TNC).21  
The law then shifts the burden to the worker; the employer must inform the 
worker of her status and provide her with procedural instructions to contest 
                                                                                                                          
11 Chichester & Adams, supra note 10, at 50; see also MEISSNER & ROSENBLUM, supra note 3, at 
4 (stating that Basic Pilot became a national voluntary program in 2003 and now operates as E-Verify); 
Harper, supra note 5, at 5 (stating that Basic Pilot, which was renamed “E-Verify,” “is the remaining 
effort to verify work eligibility electronically”). 
12 Chichester & Adams, supra note 10, at 50.  In May of 2008, E-Verify had been used by most 
states on a voluntary basis, while ten required the use of E-Verify for public or private employers.  
Lizzette Romero, Note, E-Verify: Expansion and Recent Developments, 4 ISJLP 605, 610 (2008). 
13 Chichester & Adams, supra note 10, at 50.   
14 Id. 
15 Id.; Harper, supra note 5, at 5. 
16 Peter F. Asaad & Stephanie S. Wesley, E-Verify: A Trojan Horse at the Employer’s Doorstep, 
BUS. L. BRIEF, Fall 2008, at 26, 26; Chichester & Adams, supra note 10, at 50.  The INS was one of the 
twenty-two departments consolidated into DHS after the 9/11 attacks.  See infra Part III.B.2 for a 
description of the DHS’s biometrics program.  
17 MEISSNER & ROSENBLUM, supra note 3, at 4. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id.; Harper, supra note 5, at 5. 
21 MEISSNER & ROSENBLUM, supra note 3, at 4; Harper, supra note 5, at 5. 
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the TNC in case of an error.22  The worker has eight days to contest the 
TNC.23  If the worker fails to or cannot challenge the TNC, then E-Verify 
issues a final non-confirmation and the employer is required to either 
terminate the worker or notify the DHS that it is employing a noncompliant 
worker, subjecting the employer to criminal and civil penalties.24  
Additionally, the E-Verify program obliges participating employers to 
permit the SSA and DHS to make periodic “work site[]” visits and to 
“make employment and E-Verify related records available” at the 
Department’s request.25 
B. The Move To Nationalize EEV 
On June 9, 2008, DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff remarked at the 
State of Immigration Address that the “[o]ne critical tool for our success 
[in curbing illegal immigration] is giving the employer the means to check 
whether the applicant for a job is in fact presenting a valid social security 
number and name that match what is in our government databases.”26  In 
another speech on August 10, 2007, he outlined a plan to expand EEV and 
its underlying policy in three key areas.27  First, DHS would designate E-
Verify as the EEV system in which all federal contractors and vendors 
must participate.28  This expansion added a potential 200,000 companies to 
the 52,000 who were using E-Verify at that time, bringing the total number 
of American companies using the system to 3.5 percent.29  Second, 
Secretary Chertoff announced DHS’s creation of a “no-match” regulation 
increasing an employer’s liability if its workers’ names and SSNs do not 
correspond to SSA records.  The new policy would raise penalties by 
twenty-five percent and expand criminal investigations into employers who 
were charged with violating the DHS policy.30  Third, Secretary Chertoff 
advocated integrating information in the national database utilized by E-
                                                                                                                          
22 MEISSNER & ROSENBLUM, supra note 3, at 4–5; Harper, supra note 5, at 5. 
23 MEISSNER & ROSENBLUM, supra note 3, at 5; Harper, supra note 5, at 5. 
24 MEISSNER & ROSENBLUM, supra note 3, at 5; Harper, supra note 5, at 5.  Workers who receive 
TNCs and fail to challenge them comprise almost eighty-five percent of TNC cases.  MEISSNER & 
ROSENBLUM, supra note 3, at 5.  An employer is subjected to fines that range “from $500 to $1,000 for 
each failure to notify the DHS.  If the employer continues to employ the worker after [receiving] a final 
nonconfirmation, there is a rebuttable presumption that the employer is knowingly employing an 
unauthorized worker.”  Chichester & Adams, supra note 10, at 51. 
25 Chichester & Adams, supra note 10, at 51 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
26 Michael Chertoff, Homeland Sec. Sec’y, & Carlos Gutierrez, Commerce Sec’y, State of 
Immigration Address (June 9, 2008) [hereinafter Chertoff & Gutierrez, Immigration Address], 
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1213101513448.shtm.  
27 Michael Chertoff, Homeland Sec. Sec’y, & Carlos Gutierrez, Commerce Sec’y, Press 
Conference on Border Security and Administrative Immigration Reforms (Aug. 10, 2007) [hereinafter 
Chertoff & Gutierrez, Border Security], available at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/ 
pr_1186781502047.shtm. 
28 Harper, supra note 5, at 6; Chertoff & Gutierrez, Border Security, supra note 27. 
29 Harper, supra note 5, at 6. 
30 Id.; Chertoff & Gutierrez, Border Security, supra note 27. 
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Verify with other information databases.31  This would include access to 
information from visas, passports, and state motor vehicle records, which 
would “lay the ground work for further expansion.”32 
Although Congress has yet to pass a law requiring all employers to use 
E-Verify, recently several bills have been introduced in both the House and 
Senate to nationalize some form of E-Verify.  One legislator commented 
on how there were currently eleven different proposals before the House 
Judiciary Subcommittee suggesting reforms to E-Verify in preparation for 
a national EEV program.33  In April 2009, Representative Gabrielle 
Giffords of Arizona and Representative Sam Johnson of Texas introduced 
House Resolution 2028, the New Employee Verification Act (NEVA), 
which would extend the E-Verify program five more years and create a 
new, more secure verification program in which employers could also 
enroll.34  The new system, like E-Verify, would rely on the SSA and DHS 
databases and include biometric information.35   
In a hearing held in July 2009, Senator Charles Schumer endorsed 
passing a bill that would create a “tough, fair, and effective employment 
verification system,” and Representative Luis Gutierrez stated that an 
“employment verification system must be part of [any] comprehensive 
immigration reform” package.36  Senator Schumer outlined ten 
characteristics, including requiring biometric information from prospective 
workers, that he said were needed for a successful EEV system.37  Several 
legislators also voiced their support for a national EEV program and 
                                                                                                                          
31 Chertoff & Gutierrez, Border Security, supra note 27.  
32 Harper, supra note 5, at 6 (quoting the White House’s statement in a fact sheet released August 
10, 2007).  Note that the fact sheet Harper cites is now available through the DHS website at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1186757867585.shtm. 
33 Electronic Employment Verification Systems: Needed Safeguards to Protect Privacy and 
Prevent Misuse: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec., 
and Int’l Law of the H. Judiciary Comm., 110th Cong. 6 (2008) [hereinafter Electronic Employment 
Verification Systems] (statement of Rep. Conyers). 
34 H.R. 2028, 111th Cong. §§ 101, 102 (2009); Chichester & Adams, supra note 10, at 61. 
35 H.R. 2028 § 103(b)(2)(A); Chichester & Adams, supra note 10, at 61. 
36 Ensuring a Legal Workforce: What Changes Should Be Made to Our Current Employment 
Verification System?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees and Border Sec. of the 
S. Judiciary Comm., 111th Cong. 1–2, 10 (2009) [hereinafter Ensuring a Legal Workforce] (statements 
of Sen. Schumer, Chairman, S. Judiciary Subcomm., and Rep. Gutierrez). 
37 Id. at 2–4.  The characteristics outlined by Senator Schumer are: (1) requiring employers to 
check information against a federal immigration system; (2) using biometric identifiers to identify 
prospective workers; (3) requiring employers to use the system on all prospective workers regardless of 
immigration or citizenship status; (4) creating an inexpensive, easy-to-use, and quick program; (5) 
exonerating employers who hire illegal workers because EEV returns false positives; (6) punishing 
employers not using EEV when they hire illegal workers and employers using EEV when they 
“knowingly hire illegal workers”; (7) funding the system with fees paid by non-citizens when they 
obtain work permits and authorization; (8) ensuring significant and substantial protections built into 
EEV to prevent workers from being erroneously denied work and allowing workers to work while 
resolving TNCs; (9) requiring security checks when biometric information is collected and entered into 
the system; and (10) safeguarding the privacy and civil liberties of workers and only allowing the 
system to be used for employment verification purposes.   
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reforms that could make such a system possible, including the addition of a 
biometric element.38   
The House Judiciary Committee held a similar hearing where 
representatives also expressed support for nationalizing EEV.  The 
discussion centered around existing shortfalls in E-Verify and reforms 
necessary to expand the program nationally.39  Representative Heath 
Shuler of North Carolina advocated for phasing in a mandatory EEV 
system within a four-year period.40  Representative Steven King of Iowa 
suggested incorporating naturalization databases into the existing SSA and 
DHS databases used by E-Verify.41 
Legislation has also been proposed that would have required new-hires 
to have a “REAL ID Act-compliant” card.42  The REAL ID Act, passed in 
2005, imposes security, authentication, and issuance procedural standards 
for state driver’s licenses and state ID cards.43  Most states, however, have 
yet to comply with the Act.  In April 2008, all fifty states had received or 
applied for extensions beyond the May 11, 2008 deadline.44  By October of 
2009, twenty-six states had adopted resolutions that declared their intent 
not to comply with the program.45   
Several states have passed legislation mandating that certain employers 
participate in the E-Verify program.  As of November 2010, Arizona, 
Mississippi, South Carolina, and Utah required all employers in those 
                                                                                                                          
38 Id. at 5, 7, 9.  These include Senators John Cornyn, Jeff Sessions, and Representative Luis 
Gutierrez, who was a witness at the Senate hearing.   
39 Electronic Employment Verification Systems, supra note 33, at 1. 
40 Id. at 33.  
41 Id. at 54. 
42 S. 1348, 110th Cong. (2007).  Called the “Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007,” 
the bill was eventually defeated when it failed to garner the sixty votes necessary to move it from 
debate to passage.  Michael Sandler & Jonathan Allen, Senate Gives Up on Immigration Bill, CONG. Q. 
TODAY, June 7, 2007.   
43 Real ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-13, § 202, 119 Stat. 231, 312–15 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); Mimi Hall, States Get ‘Real ID’ Extensions, USA TODAY, Apr. 2, 2008, 
available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-04-02-realid_N.htm. 
44 Real ID Act § 202(a)(1) (providing that the requirements will go into effect three years from the 
May 11, 2005 date of enactment); Hall, supra note 43 (stating that DHS granted all 50 states 
extensions). 
45 See Anti-Real ID Legislation in the States, REALNIGHTMARE.ORG, 
http://www.realnightmare.org/news/105/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2010) (displaying states who passed 
legislation prohibiting REAL ID or resolutions denouncing REAL ID); see also Jaikumar Vijayan, 
Obama Will Inherit a Real Mess on REAL ID: The Effort To Impose National Standards for Photo IDs 
Remains a Bone of Contention Between Federal and State Officials, COMPUTERWORLD, Dec. 22, 2008, 
available at http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/331497/Obama_Will_Inherit_A_Real_Mess 
_On_Real_ID (discussing Arizona Governor Janet Napolitano’s signing of an Arizona bill barring the 
state from participating in the program).  Napolitano, a strong opponent of the REAL ID program, was 
appointed as head of DHS when President Obama took office, placing the future of the Act in uncertain 
waters.  Id.  But see Dennis Myers, REAL ID Is Coming: As Obama and Congress Slow a Federal 
Driver License to a Crawl, Gibbons and DMV Race Ahead, NEWSREVIEW.COM (Feb. 11, 2010), 
http://www.newsreview.com/reno/content?oid=1369527 (reporting on the Nevada Governor’s push for 
REAL ID). 
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states to enroll in E-Verify.46  Georgia, Idaho, Missouri, and Nebraska 
currently require that all state offices and all or most state contractors 
participate in the program, while Minnesota and Rhode Island have 
extended the mandate to only their executive branches and state 
contractors.47  North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Virginia have also passed 
legislation that requires state offices to use E-Verify.48  Tennessee provides 
incentives for private employers who voluntarily use the program and 
immunizes employers enrolled in the E-Verify program from state 
                                                                                                                          
46 See Legal Arizona Workers Act, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-214(A) (Supp. 2009) (“[E]very 
employer . . . shall verify the employment eligibility of the employee through the e-verify  
program.”); Mississippi Employment Protection Act, MISS. CODE ANN. § 71-11-3(4)(b)(i) (2010)  
(“Every employer shall register with and utilize the status verification system to verify the federal 
employment authorization status of all newly hired employees.”); South Carolina Illegal Immigration 
Reform Act, S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-14-20(A) (Supp. 2009) (“[E]very public employer shall register and 
participate in the federal work authorization program to verify the employment authorization of all new 
employees.”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-47-201(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2010) (“A private employer who 
employs 15 or more employees . . . may not hire a new employee . . . unless the private employer . . . 
uses the status verification system to verify the federal legal working status of the new  
employee . . . .”). 
47 See Georgia Security and Immigration Compliance Act, GA. CODE ANN. § 13-10-91(a)–(b) 
(West Supp. 2009) (“Every public employer . . . shall register and participate in the federal work 
authorization program to verify employment eligibility of all newly hired employees. . . .  No public 
employer shall [contract] for the physical performance of services . . . unless the contractor . . . 
participates in the federal work authorization program . . . .”); Idaho Exec. Order No. 2006–40 (May 
29, 2009), available at http://gov.idaho.gov/mediacenter/execorders/eo09/eo_2009_10.html (“The 
Division of Human Resources shall . . . verify and ensure that all new employees with any agency of 
the State of Idaho are eligible for employment under federal and state law. . . . [A]ll contractors and 
subcontractors [must] declare to the contracting state agency that they have substantiated that all 
employees providing services”); MO. ANN. STAT. § 285.530.2 (West Supp. 2010) (“As a condition for 
the award of any contract or grant in excess of five thousand dollars . . . the business entity shall . . . 
affirm its enrollment and participation in a federal work authorization program with respect to the 
employees working in connection with the contracted services.”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 4-114(2) (Supp. 
2009) (“Every public employer and public contractor shall register with and use a federal immigration 
verification system to determine the work eligibility status of new employees physically performing 
services within the State of Nebraska.”); Minn. Exec. Order No. 08-01 (Jan. 7, 2008), available at 
http://www.governor.state.mn.us/mediacenter/pressreleases/printerfriendly/PROD008598.html 
(“Requiring all hiring authorities within the executive branch of state government to use the federal 
electronic work verification program (‘E-Verify’).”; R.I. Exec. Order No. 08-01, available at  
http://www.governor.ri.gov/documents/executiveorders/2008/01_illegal_immigration_control_ 
order.pdf (“The Deparment of Administration shall register and use the federal government’s E-Verify 
program . . . [and] shall require that all persons and business . . . doing business with the state of Rhode 
Island also register with . . . the E-Verify Program.”). 
48 N.C. GEN. STAT § 126-7.1(f) (2010) (“Each State agency, department, institution, university, 
community college, and local education agency shall verify, in accordance with the Basic Pilot 
Program administered by the United States Department of Homeland Security . . . .”); The Oklahoma 
Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act of 2007, OKLA. STAT. tit. 25, § 1313.A (West 2007) (“Every 
public employer shall register with and utilize a Status Verification System . . . .”); VA. CODE ANN § 
40.1–11.2 (Supp. 2010) (“All agencies of the Commonwealth shall be enrolled in the E-Verify program 
by December 1, 2012 . . . .”).  A U.S. District Court has delayed enforcement of the law in Oklahoma 
by granting a preliminary injunction against it and, therefore, it is not in effect.  Chamber of Commerce 
of the U.S. v. Henry, No. CIV-08-109-C, 2008 WL 2329164, at *8 (W.D. Okla. June 4, 2008).  In 
February 2010, the Tenth Circuit, reversing in part and affirming in part the District Court’s decision, 
upheld the injunction.  Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Edmondson, 742 F.3d 742, 771 (10th Cir. 
2010). 
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sanctions.49  Likewise, Arkansas, Indiana, Ohio, Rhode Island, and 
Wyoming have introduced legislation that would mandate EEV 
participation for some or all of the employers in their state.50  A number of 
local governments have also initiated some mandatory EEV requirements 
in the absence of federal law.  For example, the city of Mission Viejo, 
California requires employers that have contracts with the city to confirm 
worker eligibility through E-Verify.51  Columbia County, Oregon also 
passed an ordinance requiring all county employers to use E-Verify.52   
Only one state has reacted adversely to the voluntary program.  The 
Illinois legislature passed a statute that banned employers from using E-
Verify until SSA and DHS could provide a response within three days in 
ninety-nine percent of the cases that receive a TNC.  In March 2009, 
however, a U.S. District Court struck down the Illinois provision, allowing 
employers to enroll voluntarily in the program or to opt-out.53  
C.  Assessing the Current State of E-Verify 
E-Verify offers some advantages against legal liability to employers 
and workers who voluntarily participate in the program.  First, when an 
employer hires a worker authorized by the system, the employer is 
presumed to have not knowingly hired an undocumented worker should an 
action be brought against that employer.54  This is particularly important as 
DHS worksite raids are unlikely to cease during the Obama 
administration.55  There is also a special benefit for U.S. college graduates 
who are foreign nationals and who would like to extend their stays in the 
United States: employers who participate in E-Verify may extend the 
former student’s “Optional Practical Training” work permit for an 
additional seventeen months.56  Several states have also extended benefits 
to employers who participate in the program, offering state contracts 
exclusively to those employers or immunizing them from legal liability.57  
During the program’s thirteen-year stint, many enhancements and 
corrections have been made, offering a systematic stability that could work 
                                                                                                                          
49 TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-103(d) (2008) (“A person has not violated subsection (b) . . . if the 
person verified the immigrant status of the person . . . by using the federal electronic work 
authorization verification service provided by the United States department of homeland  
security . . . .”). 
50 Chichester & Adams, supra note 10, at 53 
51 Id. 
52 Id.  
53 United States v. Illinois, No. 07-3261, 2009 WL 662703, at *3 (C.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2009). 
54 Chichester & Adams, supra note 10, at 51. 
55 Dawn Lurie, Employers Beware: DHS’s Shifting Priorities in Immigration Worksite 
Enforcement, SECURITY DEBRIEF (June 10, 2009), http://securitydebrief.adfero.com/2009/06/10/ 
employers-beware-dhss-shifting-priorities-in-immigration-worksite-enforcement/.  
56 Chichester & Adams, supra note 10, at 51. 
57 See supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text for a discussion on various state requirements 
and incentives for using E-Verify.  
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on a national level.58  Jonathan Scharfen, Acting Director of the United 
States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), testified to the 
House Judiciary Subcommittee that the government has made significant 
improvements to E-Verify, which have decreased mismatches and other 
mistakes in the databases, enhanced user ability, reduced typographical 
errors, protected data privacy, and deterred document fraud.59  USCIS 
plans to integrate passport and visa data into the program, to strengthen the 
system’s accuracy.60  Also, because many employers and government users 
are familiar with E-Verify, a national implementation may cost less than 
creating a new one from the ground up.  
E-Verify does, however, exhibit problems and place burdens on 
various entities, which would be exacerbated if the number of users 
increased exponentially, should Congress require all employers to 
participate.  First, the program places significant burdens on the employer.  
Each participant must obtain photocopies of a new employee’s 
Employment Authorization Card or Permanent Residence Card issued by 
DHS, which is ordinarily not required by federal law.61  For small business 
owners—who lack photocopying resources—such a requirement creates 
time and monetary costs.  Large companies may also be burdened by the 
initial implementation cost, as hiring processes would need to be 
restructured, new documents would need to be created, and employee 
training would be necessary.62  Participation in the program exposes 
employers to SSA or DHS worksite visits that can disrupt business 
operations and further expose a business to other civil or criminal 
                                                                                                                          
58 Many legislators have also lauded the benefits of E-Verify in comparison to other national 
verification programs.  For example, Representative King said the system provides “a fast and easy 
method” to verify a prospective worker’s employability, which he claimed was evidenced by the 1,000 
employers who have signed up weekly to participate in the voluntary program.  Electronic Employment 
Verification Systems, supra note 33, at 3–4.  Representative Lamar Smith of Texas reported that 
employers using E-Verify did not feel overburdened and were generally satisfied with the system’s 
performance.  Id. at 5.  He added that the program rejected less than one percent of persons eligible to 
work and accepted over ninety-seven percent of workers born outside the United States.  Id.  
59 Id. at 46–47; MARC R. ROSENBLUM, MIGRATION POLICY INST., THE BASICS OF E-VERIFY, THE 
US EMPLOYER VERIFICATION SYSTEM (2009), http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/ 
display.cfm?ID=726.  In the last six years, several improvements have been made to E-Verify: (1) in 
2005, E-Verify switched from a phone-based system to an internet-based one making data and usability 
easier; (2) in 2008, DHS improved the communication links among its databases allowing real-time 
updates of new immigrants’ information; (3) in 2007, a photo-screening tool was added to limit identity 
fraud; and (4) in 2008, DHS allowed for DHS database confirmations, even when SSA databases had 
not been updated to reflect a new citizen’s changed status.  Id. 
60 Electronic Employment Verification Systems, supra note 33, at 46 (statement of John Scharfen, 
Acting Director, USCIS). 
61 Chichester & Adams, supra note 10, at 51. 
62 Asaad & Wesley, supra note 16, at 27.  The American Council on International Personnel 
stated that significant implementation costs could be expected for large and complex organizations.  
These include performing legal reviews, altering the process for hiring workers, developing protocols 
for resolving TNC and final nonconfirmations, and training staff.  Id.  One company reported that it 
cost $40,000 annually to outsource E-Verify services.  Id. 
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penalties.63  Enrollment itself does not immunize an employer from 
penalties, and many employers may falsely believe that once they enact the 
system there is no need to continue to heed existing immigration laws.  As 
a national E-Verify system has not been tested, screening problems may 
create chaos for the participating employer, SSA, and DHS offices. 
Second, the mandate also places burdens on the federal government 
and taxpayers.  A Government Accountability Office (GAO) study found 
that mandating E-Verify participation would “substantially increase” the 
demands on DHS and SSA resources.64  A mandated program could cost 
DHS over $400 million annually and add 3.6 million additional visits or 
phone calls to SSA field offices.65  As things stand, many of the TNC-
initiated investigations are false positives, yielding few final non-
conformations.66  Most TNC-generated inquiries stem from changes in 
citizenship status or in names that have not been updated in the SSA 
database.67  Assuming nationwide enrollment, the current one percent error 
rate would affect 600,000 workers per year.68  That error rate would also 
likely increase as a mandatory system would increase enrollment, placing 
greater strain on the system’s infrastructure.  Staffing universal enrollment 
could also create new and unforeseeable types of errors.69 
Aside from negative effects on employers and government resources, 
E-Verify also places burdens on the prospective workers, who are screened 
when applying for jobs.  Many foreign-born applicants are particularly 
vulnerable to misspellings and incorrect name order in the SSA and DHS 
databases.70  This type of error usually leads to a TNC, which initially 
prevents the worker from securing employment.71  Further, E-Verify 
requires the employer to inform the worker of the TNC.72  Should an 
employer fail to notify the worker, the worker may miss her opportunity to 
                                                                                                                          
63 A DHS raid on six Swift & Co. (now JBS Swift & Co.) meat processing plants, for example, 
cost the company 1,200 workers and fifty-three million dollars, despite the fact that the company had 
used E-Verify for many years.  Id. at 26.   
64 Romero, supra note 12, at 612.  Despite the fact that some companies do everything 
permissible to ascertain the immigration status of all workers through E-Verify and still enjoy some 
legal benefits from participation, they are not immune to the economic impacts of raids when they 
unknowingly hire illegal workers.  
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 613.  Other errors can occur as a result of employer mistakes and “[r]oot errors” in the 
database, which are underlying mistakes in the SSA and DHS databases. MEISSNER & ROSENBLUM, 
supra note 3, at 8 n.26. 
67 Romero, supra note 12, at 613. 
68 MEISSNER & ROSENBLUM, supra note 3, at 8. 
69 Id. at 8 n.27 (stating that the GAO estimates that verification of all new hires would require E-
Verify to process sixty-three million queries per year). 
70 Because many names have multiple spellings, some cultures use different name orders, and 
some languages require transliteration from non-Latin alphabets, foreign-born citizens are more likely 
to face such errors.  Id. at 6.   
71 See id. at 5–6 (stating that “errors may prevent US citizens and other legal workers from 
initially–or occasionally ever–being confirmed”). 
72 Id. at 5.   
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contest the TNC and then lose her job.  The program also burdens the 
worker with the responsibility of contesting the TNC.73  This responsibility 
disadvantages the worker, who may have to miss important training or take 
unpaid time off to contact the USCIS or SSA to correct the error.74  The 
TNC may also go unresolved if the prospective worker is unfamiliar with 
the resolution process.  These problems disproportionately affect legal 
immigrants, foreign-born citizens, and other minorities.75 
As many in Congress have noted, the current E-Verify system also 
suffers from inherent vulnerabilities that undocumented workers can easily 
exploit.  For example, although the system can determine whether a SSN 
provided by a prospective worker is valid, it cannot determine whether that 
SSN actually belongs to that worker.76  E-Verify, therefore, lacks the 
ability to ensure that the worker presenting the SSN is the actual person to 
whom the information belongs.77   
Other E-Verify shortcomings stem from its reliance on employer 
enforcement.  The participating employer is required to collect and 
examine all worker documents at the time of hire.78  The employer must 
attest under penalty of perjury that it has made a good faith examination of 
the worker’s documents, that it found them to be genuine, and that the 
worker appears to be eligible to work.79  Employers, however, often fail to 
accurately do this, because at the opening of the employment relationship, 
the employer has little incentive to examine a prospective worker’s 
identity.80  The “identification-by-card process” also contains many 
weaknesses that either party might exploit.81  Along the same lines, the 
system is vulnerable to identity fraud initiated by the employer, because 
the employer stands as a first-line enforcer of E-Verify’s policies with 
                                                                                                                          
73 See id. (explaining that “[w]orkers have eight business days to contact the appropriate federal 
agency and initiate a challenge to the TNC, which generally requires calling [USCIS] or visiting an 
SSA field office”). 
74 Id. at 6. 
75 See id. at 6 n.19 (stating that “[t]he known error rate (i.e., corrected TNCs) in 2006–2007 was 
30 times higher for foreign-born than native-born workers, and 98 times higher for naturalized US 
citizens than for native-born citizens”). 
76 Asaad & Wesley, supra note 16, at 27.  Many workers who were caught in a DHS raid at 
Howard Industries had illegally obtained and used valid Social Security numbers.  Id. 
77  As Michael Aytes, Acting Director of the USCIS, noted, the system was not designed to detect 
identity theft, but that recently a photo screening tool was added to “combat document and identity 
fraud.”  Ensuring a Legal Workforce, supra note 36, at 13. 
78 MEISSNER & ROSENBLUM, supra note 3, at 9. 
79 Harper, supra note 5, at 11. 
80 See id. (explaining that the initial interaction between an employer and prospective worker is 
not like ongoing personal relationships, and that the prospective worker of a low-skill job  “proffers his 
or her identity for the first time”). 
81 See, e.g., id. at 11–13 fig.1 (describing “the three steps by which a card transfers identity 
information from the ID subject (the cardholder) to the ID verifier (or relying party)” and their 
vulnerabilities). 
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little, if any, government oversight.82  E-Verify cannot prevent the 
employer from hiring a worker “under the table” when she has knowledge 
of an undocumented applicant but needs the worker’s services.83  
D.  House Resolution 2028 
In June 2008, the House Judiciary Subcommittee held a public hearing 
consisting of three panels to address the need for an EEV system that 
would protect worker privacy and prevent employer misuse.84  At the time 
of the hearing, there were eleven bills pending before the Judiciary 
Committee, each proposing a nationally mandated EEV system.85  One bill, 
introduced by Representative Gabrielle Giffords of Arizona, included the 
option for a worker to “lock” her identity after submitting her SSN to an 
employer for verification.86  Another proposal incorporated a photograph-
screening tool that would compare the photos of passports on record with 
photos presented by the worker.87  But the most promising solution 
presented to combat identify fraud was House Bill 2028 (“NEVA”), a 
bipartisan bill that would incorporate biometric identification information 
such as fingerprint images or retinal scans of the prospective worker into 
E-Verify.88 
NEVA extends E-Verify for another five years.89   The bill requires 
employers who must participate, or who are voluntarily participating, in a 
verification program, to use either E-Verify or the Secure Employment 
Eligibility Verification System (“SEEVS”), an automated employment 
verification system established by NEVA.90  Like E-Verify, SEEVS 
requires employers to check information provided by the prospective 
worker with data housed by the SSA and DHS.91  But the new program 
calls for the protection of authenticated information through the use of 
                                                                                                                          
82 MEISSNER & ROSENBLUM, supra note 3, at 10 (“Inaccurate verification allows bad-faith 
employers and unauthorized workers to go through the motions of compliance . . . while still violating 
the law. . . .”).   
83 Id. 
84 Electronic Employment Verification Systems, supra note 33, at 1. 
85 The hearing was the third in a series of hearings addressing immigration reform, the problems 
with the “current paper-based system” and the proposals to improve EEV.  Id. 
86 Id. at 36–37.  The proposal would also create private-sector, government-certified companies to 
authenticate the identities of new employees through background checks and document screening tools.  
Id. at 37. 
87 Id. at 46 (statement of Jonathan Scharfen, Acting Director, USCIS). 
88 H.R. 2028, 111th Cong. § 103(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2009).  The bill was introduced on April 22, 2009.  
On May 26, 2009, it was referred to the House Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, 
Border Security, and International Law where it currently remains.  H.R. 2028: New Employee 
Verification Act of 2009, GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-2028 
(last visited Nov. 19, 2010).  
89 H.R. 2028 § 101(1). 
90 Id. § 102(c)(1)(E). 
91 Id. § 103(b)(2)(A)(i). 
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biometric technology, a service to be provided by private third parties.92  
Employers who participate in SEEVS and follow required procedures, like 
those who participate in E-Verify, enjoy a presumption that the employer 
has not violated NEVA should DHS discover illegal workers.93 
The bill also provides privacy protection for biometric data collected 
for SEEVS.  First, it requires that stored biometric information be 
encrypted and segregated from other identifying information.94  Second, it 
allows biometric data to be maintained and linked to identifying 
information of the new worker only if she consents.95  Additionally, the bill 
requires that the worker’s identifying and biometric information be 
removed from the system should she choose to cancel enrollment.96  
III. SURVEYING BIOMETRICS 
A.  Biometric Technologies 
Although the term may seem obscure, biometrics is nothing more than 
the measurement or analysis of unique physical or behavioral 
characteristics generally as a means to verify personal identity.97  Prior to 
the 9/11 attacks, the use of biometric technologies had been increasing.  
Government agencies had already required the use of biometrics to control 
access to secure areas, and private companies had started using them to 
facilitate retail payment plans.98  Of the many possible biometric 
technologies, eight were developed, tested, and placed in the public and 
private sectors.99  But despite their presence, many people had little 
experience working with biometrics and the media had “virtually no 
knowledge” of biometric technology issues.100   
The events of September 11, 2001 “led to an increase in calls for the 
use of biometrics.”101  Over the following years, biometrics evolved from a 
novel technology with limited application to a ubiquitous tool with a wide 
                                                                                                                          
92 Id. § 103(b)(2)(A)(ii). 
93 Id. § 102(d)(3). 
94 Id. § 103(b)(2)(D)(i). 
95 Id. § 103(b)(2)(D)(ii). 
96 Id. § 103(b)(4)(C). 
97 Biometrics Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/biometrics (last visited Nov. 19, 2010). 
98 WILLIAM SLOAN COATS ET AL., THE PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO BIOMETRICS 1 (William Sloan 
Coats ed., 2007). 
99 JOHN D. WOODWARD, JR. ET AL., ARMY BIOMETRIC APPLICATIONS: IDENTIFYING AND 
ADDRESSING SOCIOCULTURAL CONCERNS xv (2001) [hereinafter WOODWARD, JR. ET AL., ARMY 
BIOMETRIC APPLICATIONS].  Those eight include fingerprint, hand and finger geometry, facial 
recognition, voice recognition, iris scans, retinal scans, dynamic signature verification, and keystroke 
dynamics technology.  Id. 
100 NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, BIOMETRICS IN GOVERNMENT POST-9/11: ADVANCING 
SCIENCE, ENHANCING OPERATIONS 7 (2008). 
101 COATS ET AL., supra note 98, at 1.  
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variety of applications across a broad range of industries.102  In a post-9/11 
world, biometrics has mainly served as a purported failsafe security device 
used by governments in border patrol management, law enforcement, and 
counterterrorism.103  The federal government has focused biometric 
research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) efforts on four 
key areas: facial recognition, fingerprint identification, retinal 
identification, and multimodal biometric identification.104  Multiple federal 
agencies “collaboratively planned, funded, and managed” these research 
activities, enabling the federal government to establish new, and to 
enhance existing, biometric technologies to improve U.S. security.105  
1.  Facial Recognition 
Facial recognition is the automated process of recording the 
geometrically distinct features of the face, which are stored in a database, 
and then comparing them with samples for authentication.106  An 
advantage of facial recognition is that “it can be easily confirmed by a 
system operator, such as a guard, by comparing a picture in [the] database” 
with an individual’s facial features.107  It is also “less intrusive” than any 
other biometric technology.108 
 Facial recognition systems represent about ten percent of the 
biometrics technology market share.109  As the technology became more 
commercialized, the federal government began a series of evaluations for 
facial recognition systems.110  Since 2000, there have been three 
evaluations, which have consecutively increased in size, difficulty, and 
complexity.111  These evaluations provided a snapshot of facial recognition 
                                                                                                                          
102 Examine the Global Biometric Forecast to 2012, MARKETWIRE (Oct. 20, 2008 1:51 PM), 
http://www.marketwire.com/press-release/Examine-the-Global-Biometric-Forecast-to-2012-
911606.htm.  One market research report estimates that the compound annual growth rate of biometric 
technologies will exceed twenty percent through 2012.  Id.  
103 COATS ET AL., supra note 98, at 10–11. 
104 NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 100, at 13.  Although NEVA does not require 
specific biometrics technologies, for the purpose of this Note I will only discuss the four technologies 
on which the federal government has increased RDT&E efforts.  NEVA requires that the SEEVS “shall 
utilize the services of private sector entities,” or enrollment providers, for “protection of the 
authenticated information [of a prospective worker] through [the use of] biometric technology.”  H.R. 
2028, 111th Cong. § 103(b)(2)(A) (2009).  Congress would likely evaluate potential biometric 
technology companies through a bidding process or by establishing a committee to evaluate existing 
biometric technologies and then requiring prospective vendors to provide a specific biometric 
technology or combination thereof.   
105 NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 100, at 12. 
106 WOODWARD, JR. ET AL., ARMY BIOMETRIC APPLICATIONS, supra note 99, at 16. 
107 COATS ET AL., supra note 98, at 4.  
108 Id.  
109 Id.  
110 NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 100, at 13. 
111 For more information on all three tests and their results, see FACE RECOGNITION VENDOR 
TEST, http://www.frvt.org/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2010) (describing the 2006 results of the Face 
Recognition Vendor Test results and providing links to the results of previous years).   
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capabilities and proved that some systems were comparable to, or better 
than, humans at facial recognition.112  One of the most notable uses of 
facial recognition technology was at the 2001 Super Bowl in Tampa Bay.  
As attendees entered the stadium, the Tampa Bay Police Department used 
facial recognition technology to scan faces and compare them with face 
images in the police department’s database.113   
Of course, facial recognition technology is not without flaws.  
Environmental factors, such as lighting and the level of user cooperation, 
can adversely affect a system’s performance.114  Likewise, a user could 
fool a scanner by significantly altering her facial appearance.115  Even 
under the best conditions, the performance of facial recognition systems is 
not high enough to a reasonable degree of reliability without severely 
constraining the system.116  To address these and other concerns, the 
government sponsored two initiatives: the Facial Recognition Grand 
Challenge in 2004 and the Face Recognition Advanced Study Workshop in 
2005. 117  
2.  Fingerprint Identification and Verification 
Fingerprint biometrics is one of the least intrusive and best known 
biometrics technologies.118  It is an automated digital version of the older 
ink-and-paper method used by law enforcement agents.119  A user scans her 
fingerprints to be read and checked against previously recorded copies.120  
Fingerprint technology represents almost half of the biometric technology 
market share.121   
                                                                                                                          
112 P. JONATHON PHILLIPS ET AL., NAT’L INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECH., FRVT 2006 AND 
ICE 27 2006 LARGE-SCALE RESULTS 27 (2007) (“The ability of algorithms to recognize faces across 
illumination changes has made significant progress.”). 
113 Jessica Reaves, Tampa Gets Ready for Its Closeup, TIME, July 16, 2001, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,167846,00.html. 
114 WOODWARD, JR. ET AL., ARMY BIOMETRIC APPLICATIONS, supra note 99, at 16; see also Ellen 
Nakashima, FBI Prepares Vast Database of Biometrics; $1 Billion Project to Include Images of Irises 
and Faces, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 2007, at A1 (reporting that a German study found that current facial 
recognition technique had a sixty percent success rate during daylight but only a ten to twenty percent 
rate at night). 
115 John D. Woodward, Biometric Scanning, Law & Policy: Identifying the Concerns—Drafting 
the Biometric Blueprint, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 97, 106 (1997) [hereinafter Woodward, Biometric 
Scanning]. 
116 RUUD BOLLE ET AL., GUIDE TO BIOMETRICS 40 (2004). 
117 NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 100, at 14; see also P. JONATHON PHILLIPS ET AL., 
NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., FRGC, OVERVIEW OF THE FACE RECOGNITION GRAND 
CHALLENGE 1 (2005) (describing the FRGC’s goal to “achieve [an] increase in performance by 
pursuing development of algorithms” for the improvement of facial recognition technology).  The 
FRASW was a two-day invitation-only workshop, where fifty-five participants were sequestered in 
intensive technical deliberations.  FACE RECOGNITION ADVANCED STUDY RESEARCH, 
http://www.wvu.edu/~facerecognition/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2010).  
118 COATS ET AL., supra note 98, at 4.  
119 WOODWARD, JR. ET AL., ARMY BIOMETRICS APPLICATIONS, supra note 99, at 16. 
120 Id.  
121 COATS ET AL., supra note 98, at 4.  
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Capturing a fingerprint can be difficult because some people cannot 
generate clean fingerprint images and accuracy decreases with the user’s 
age.122  The quality of the fingerprint image captured is critical because the 
scanning devices use a complex set of algorithms to match captured 
fingerprints with stored fingerprint data.123  All of the current four 
“livescan” fingerprint acquisition technologies available have some 
difficulty retrieving and storing digital fingerprints.124    
Since the 9/11 attacks, the federal government has increased its efforts 
to advance and evaluate fingerprint recognition technology.125  Through 
tests conducted in 2003 and 2004,126 the government assessed the accuracy 
of algorithms used by fingerprint systems to measure and compare 
fingerprints and to evaluate which systems performed consistently.127  The 
government has also worked to make capture devices faster and smaller.128  
Generally, a fingerprint biometrics program is employed for three reasons: 
law enforcement, fraud prevention, and access control.129  
                                                                                                                          
122 Id.  
123 BOLLE ET AL., supra note 116, at 34 (describing the different matching approaches used by 
fingerprint authentication systems). 
124 Id. at 32–35.  There are currently four common methods used to capture digital fingerprints 
and each presents its own challenge.  First, optical methods capturing a reflected signal from the 
underside of a prism as the subject touches the top have trouble capturing images when fingertips are 
too wet or too dry.  Second, CMOS capacitance converts different charge accumulations from the 
ridges and valleys of fingerprints into pixels.  On the other hand, the capturing device is sensitive to 
scratching, electrostatic discharge, and mechanical failure.  Third, thermal scanning measures 
temperature changes from the ridge-valley structure when a fingertip is swiped across a thermal 
scanner.  Although less susceptible to wetness or dryness and static discharge, the copied images are 
not rich in value or range.  Fourth, ultrasound sensing uses an ultrasonic beam scanned across the 
finger’s surface, measuring the depth of the valleys from the reflected signal.  Moisture and oils do not 
affect the sensitivity of these sensors, but they are very bulky and require longer scanning times than 
the other technology.  Id. at 3. 
125 NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 100, at 13, 15. 
126 The government began the Fingerprint Vendor Technology Evaluation in 2003, testing 
segmentation fingerprint matching systems that measure a user’s individual prints, requiring the system 
to separately capture a user’s prints on each finger.  Those tests revealed that top-performing systems 
performed consistently well over a variety of image types and data sources and confirmed the degree 
that additional fingers improve system accuracy.  The system also revealed the degradation of accuracy 
caused by the collection of poor-quality prints.  The government conducted a second series of 
evaluations in 2004, called the Slap Fingerprint Segmentation Evaluations.  Slap Fingerprint analysis 
differs from segmentation fingerprints because the user must simultaneously press her four fingers of 
one hand onto a scanner or fingerprint card and the system captures the impressions of the four fingers. 
BRADFORD ULERY ET AL., SLAP FINGERPRINT SEGMENTATION EVALUATION 2004 ANALYSIS REPORT, 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 (2005); CHARLES WILSON ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., 
FINGERPRINT VENDOR TECH. EVALUATION 2003: SUMMARY OF RESULTS AND ANALYSIS REPORT 2–3 
(2004). 
127 WILSON ET AL., supra note 126, at 3. 
128 NAT’L SCI & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 100, at 16 (describing the government’s attempt to 
advance rolled-equivalent and slap devices in 2004 through the Fast Capture Rolled-Equivalent 
Finger/Palm Print Initiative). 
129 WOODWARD, JR. ET AL., ARMY BIOMETRIC APPLICATIONS, supra note 99, at 16.   
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3.  Iris Recognition 
The colored part of the eye surrounding the pupil, called the iris, is 
extremely rich in texture.130  Iris recognition systems measure the pattern in 
the colored part of the eye, although the scan does not capture or measure 
the color.131  The iris contains distributed immutable patterns, which form 
randomly.132  No two irises are the same: the pattern in one’s left eye is 
even different from the pattern in one’s right eye.133  Moreover, these 
patterns, like fingerprints, do not change over time.134  Iris scanning 
devices account for almost ten percent of the biometric technology market 
share.135 
While iris scanning can be highly accurate, it requires a high degree of 
cooperation—and patience—from the user.136  Most commercial iris 
scanning systems “require the user to position his or her eyes within the 
field of view of a single narrow-angled camera.”137  Designing an iris 
capture device that is “convenient and unobtrusive” is a challenge.138  The 
device needs to be sensitive enough to account not only for variations in 
ambient lighting from one situation to the next, but also for reflections of 
light from the eyeball, glasses, and contact lenses.139  Thus, iris-scanning 
devices are one of the most expensive types of biometric technology.140 
To improve the utility, performance, and ease-of-use of iris scanning, 
the federal government substantially increased its investments in the 
technology after the 9/11 attacks.141  These investments have led to “iris-
on-the-move” and “iris-at-a-distance” recognition systems.142  In 2004, 
                                                                                                                          
130 BOLLE ET AL., supra note 116, at 43. 
131 WOODWARD, JR. ET AL., ARMY BIOMETRIC APPLICATIONS, supra note 99, at 17. 
132 Id.  
133 Id.  These patterns, like fingerprints, are the results of the developmental process, not genetics.  
BOLLE ET AL., supra note 116, at 43.  The iris has proven to be a good biometric identifier with high 
discriminating properties.  Id. 
134 Woodward, Biometric Scanning, supra note 115, at 103–04. 
135 COATS ET AL., supra note 98, at 4. 
136 Ravi Das, Retinal Recognition: Biometric Technology in Practice, 22 KEESING J. DOCUMENTS 
& IDENTITY 11, 14 (2007).  
137 BOLLE ET AL., supra note 116, at 44. 
138 Id. 
139 See id. (explaining that hard contacts create the biggest problem with reflected light pollution). 
140 COATS ET AL., supra note 98, at 4.  
141 NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 100, at 17; see also Ron Vetter, Editorial, 
Authentication by Biometric Verification, 43 COMPUTER, Feb. 2010, at 28, 28 (stating that “[i]n the past 
few years, government initiatives have spurred the growth of biometrics, and overall activities in 
biometric research have accelerated tremendously,” and that “[t]his growth is due not only to increased 
interest in security concerns after 9/11, but also in response to privacy concerns regarding the 
confidential use of personal information being stored and transmitted across the Internet”). 
142 Arun Ross, Iris Recognition: The Path Forward, 43 COMPUTER, Feb. 2010, at 30, 34.  Other 
improvements have included increased standoff distances for accurate measurements, increased system 
performance (while also reducing size and cost), and the development of prototypes capable of 
acquiring and matching the iris of users while moving through a portal.  NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, 
supra note 100, at 17–18. 
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John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York City installed an iris-
scanning system for employees to access secure areas of the airport.143  
4.  Multimodal Biometric Identification 
The previously-discussed biometric systems are unimodal systems, 
meaning they rely on evidence from a single source of information for 
authentication.144  Multimodal biometric identification systems rely on 
multiple sources of information to establish identity.145  The systems can 
fuse matching information between biometric data entered by the user and 
biometric data saved on databases.146  Prior to the 9/11 attacks, the federal 
government had “begun efforts to develop automated, multimodal systems 
for identifying people at a distance.”147  Biometric technology 
combinations explored included “facial recognition, iris recognition, 
Doppler radar, infrared imagery, pulse and heartbeat recognition, and gait 
recognition.”148  By the end of 2003, some biometric systems were capable 
of recognizing users at up to 150 feet.149  
5.  Other Feasible Biometric Options 
Although the federal government has invested significant research and 
development into four biometric technologies since the 9/11 attacks, recent 
developments may prompt Congress to consider other biometric 
technologies.  Infrared vein scanning captures images of blood vessels in 
the back of the hand with infrared light and stores the picture on a 
template.150  While the technology originally required scans of the entire 
hand or palm, Hitachi has developed a system that uses infrared LEDs and 
a CCD (charged couple device) camera to scan and capture vein patterns in 
the middle section of a finger, which it compares to a database associated 
with the application assigned to the finger.151  One author notes that “92% 
                                                                                                                          
143 Robin Feldman, Considerations on the Emerging Implementation of Biometric Technology, 25 
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 653, 661 (2003); Ina Paiva Cordle, Airports Focus on Limiting Workers’ 
Access, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 14, 2004, at E1.  
144 These systems typically suffer from five problems because of their reliance on one type of 
data: (1) noise in sensed data—a scar on a finger or cold air affecting a voice or noise interference 
emanating from faulty scanning sensors; (2) intra-class variation—variations because the user is 
incorrectly interacting with a sensor or because the sensor is modified during the authentication; (3) 
inter-class similarities—the larger the pool of user information in a database, the more likely that 
multiple users will have features that overlap; (4) non-universality—the inability of biometric systems 
to pick up meaningful biometric data from poorly defined features; and (5): spoof attacks—fraudulent 
data or behavior by users.  Arun Ross & Anil K. Jain, Multimodal Biometrics: An Overview, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 12TH EUROPEAN SIGNAL PROCESSING CONFERENCE 1221, 1221 (2004). 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 1221–22. 
147 NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 100, at 18. 
148 Id.   
149 Id. 
150 Woodward, Biometric Scanning, supra note 115, at 108. 
151 Kathy Kincade, Vein Scanning Improves Door, Car, and Computer Security, 44 LASER FOCUS 
WORLD, May 2008, at 17, 21. 
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of the financial institutions in Japan have adopted finger-vein biometric 
devices in their ATMs,”152 demonstrating that the technology is a practical 
and affordable solution. 
 B.  Current Biometric Operational Activities by the U.S. Government 
Prior to the 9/11 attacks, the federal government used two major 
biometric systems: the FBI’s Integrated Automated Fingerprint 
Identification System (IAFIS) and INS’s Automated Biometric Integrated 
System.153  Today, biometrics have permeated the operational activities of 
the Department of Defense (DOD), DHS, the Department of Justice (DOJ), 
and the State Department.  
1.  Department of Defense 
After September 11, 2001, the DOD created a biometric collection and 
storage system compatible with IAFIS to lock down the identity of known 
or suspected terrorists.154  Known as the Automated Biometrics 
Identification System (ABIS) and managed by the Biometrics Task Force 
(BTF),155 the database consists of biometric information from individuals 
captured in Iraqi and Afghani war zones.156  The resulting collaboration 
between the DOD and the FBI led to the discovery that many war 
criminals had prior criminal records in the United States.157  Similar to 
SEEVS, the DOD used the biometric information to screen Iraqi personnel 
applying for selection into the Iraqi Police Academy.  This system 
prevented known terrorists and insurgents from serving on the police force, 
ultimately leading to their recapture.158  To date, the DOD uses facial 
recognition, fingerprints, iris recognition, and palm imaging data.159  
                                                                                                                          
152 Id. at 24. 
153 NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 100, at 23. 
154 Ellen Nakashima, Post-9/11 Dragnet Turns Up Surprises; Biometrics Link Foreign Detainees 
to Arrests in U.S., WASH. POST, July 6, 2008, at A01. 
155 BTF was created in 2006 as a result of a DOD reorganization that consolidated the Biometrics 
Management Office (BMO), which managed and regulated the Department’s biometric technologies, 
and the Biometrics Fusion Center (BFC), which was responsible for evaluating and procuring 
biometrics technologies that were compatible with the Department’s information systems.  See DoD 
Biometrics Reorganization Takes Shape, 2 BIOMETRIC BULL., Mar.–Apr. 2006, 
http://www.biometrics.dod.mil/Newsletter/issues/2006/March/v2issue2_a1.htm (discussing the 
consolidation of the BMO and the BFC into the BTF); see also BIOMETRICS TASK FORCE, ANNUAL 
REPORT FY07 6 (2007), available at www.biometrics.dod.mil/Files/Documents/AnnualReports/ 
fy07.pdf (discussing the creation of ABIS and ABIS’s purpose).   
156 See Nakashima, supra note 154 (detailing the use of ABIS for maintaining records on Iraqi and 
Afgahni detainees). 
157 Id. 
158 See BIOMETRICS TASK FORCE, supra note 155, at 7 (noting that the system revealed that some 
applicants to the Iraqi Police Academy had records as terrorists or insurgents). 
159 Biometrics History Timeline, BIOMETRICS IDENTITY MGMT. AGENCY, http://www.biometrics. 
dod.mil/References/Biometrics_Timeline.aspx (last visited Nov. 19, 2010). 
 2010] BIOMETRICS IN THE HIRING PROCESS 695 
2. Department of Homeland Security 
DHS, created after the 9/11 attacks, has statutory and regulatory 
mandates to incorporate biometrics.160  Because DHS’s main function is to 
keep terrorists out of the United States, as well as to welcome international 
travelers into U.S. ports on a daily basis, DHS “incorporate[s] biometrics 
into identity documents for the purpose of freezing identity, searching 
waitlists, conducting criminal background checks, reducing fraud, 
improving border and transportation security, and granting benefits and 
credentialing.”161  DHS also provides biometric identification and analysis 
services to immigration and border management agencies, law 
enforcement departments, and intelligence communities to aid in the 
assessment of an individual’s risk to the United States.162  The vast 
majority of the data collected is in the form of digital fingerprints and 
photographs.163  DHS also manages the Transportation Worker 
Identification Credentials (TWIC) program, which uses biometrics to 
screen and verify the identities of transportation workers, who are allowed 
access to the most sensitive parts of the nation’s transportation 
infrastructure.164  Congress established the TWIC through the Marine 
Transportation Security Act, which requires the Transportation Security 
Administration to collect a transportation worker’s ten fingerprints, 
biographical information, photograph, employer information, and other 
appropriate information in exchange for access to secure areas of port 
facilities.165 
3.  Department of Justice 
Prior to September 11, 2001, the DOJ, through the FBI, maintained 
IAFIS, which, at the time of its creation was “the largest and most 
advanced biometric database in the world”; IAFIS held fingerprint data 
information linked to criminal histories from all fifty states and the U.S. 
                                                                                                                          
160 See, e.g., Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-173, 
§ 303, 116 Stat. 543, 554 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1732 (2006)) (requiring that each country participating 
in a visa waiver program “shall certify . . . that it has a program to issue to its nationals machine-
readable passports that are tamper-resistant and incorporate biometric and document authentication 
identifiers”).  DHS was created by merging twenty-two different government organizations into a 
single department.  Because many of these organizations maintain autonomy and responsibility for 
planning and managing their own biometric systems, DHS created the Biometrics Coordination Group 
(BCG) to ensure department-wide coordination.  History: Who Became Part of the Department?, U.S. 
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Apr. 11, 2008), http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/history/editorial_0133.shtm. 
161 NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 100, at 28. 
162 Id. at 29. 
163 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE BIOMETRIC 
STORAGE SYSTEM 3 (2007). 
164 TRANS. SEC. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT: 
TRANSPORTATION WORKER IDENTIFICATION CREDENTIAL (TWIC) PROTOTYPE 2 (2004). 
165 Id.  
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territories.166  After the 9/11 attacks, Congress, making national security as 
important as criminal investigation, authorized the U.S. Attorney General 
to expand IAFIS and other biometric services into the civil sector.167  In 
2007, the FBI announced that it planned to spend over one billion dollars 
to compile a biometric database, labeled Next Generation Identification 
(NGI), that would consist of digital face images, fingerprints, palm 
patterns, iris scans, and voice data.168  As of March 2010, NGI was going 
through contractor testing and is scheduled to begin operation in early 
2011.169  The FBI also coordinates with DHS to make both Departments’ 
databases interoperable.170  The FBI collaborates with the DOD obtaining 
data received from military operations abroad and providing data collected 
by the FBI.171  
4.  State Department 
The State Department has also expanded biometric efforts since the 
9/11 attacks.  The Biometric Visa Program (BioVisa) mandates biometric 
screening for visa applicants and requires the Department to use biometric 
identifiers for all visas issued to aliens.172  In 2008, the State Department 
transitioned BioVisa from the collection of two fingerprints to ten.173  
These prints are then scanned against IAFIS, which also uses a ten-
fingerprint system.174  BioVisa also uses facial-recognition technology for 
persons exempt from fingerprints during the application process.175 
                                                                                                                          
166 NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 100, at 37. 
167 Id. 
168 Calvin Biesecker, Lockheed Martin Nabs FBI Contract To Develop Multi-Modal Biometric 
Database, 237 DEF. DAILY, Feb. 13, 2008.    
169 NGI Program Holding Close to Schedule, FBI Says, 6 TERROR RESPONSE TECH. REP., Mar. 3, 
2010.  
170 NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 100, at 39. 
171 Id.  The FBI and the Department of Defense, for example, established the Automated 
Fingerprint Identification System for the Afghani government, with fingerprint data collected on a 
ninety-day mission in Afghanistan.  Id. 
172 Amendment to the Biometric Visa Program, 75 Fed. Reg. 39,323, 39,323 (July 8, 2010). 
173 Interrupting Terrorist Travel: Strengthening the Security of International Travel Documents: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Tech. and Homeland Sec. of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 110th Cong. 3 (2007) (statement of Paul Morris, Executive Director, U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection). 
174 See id. (“[T]he biometric and biographic data are checked against watch lists of known or 
suspected terrorists, outstanding wants and warrants, immigration violations, and other criminal history 
information.”); see also NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 100, at 46 (describing the search 
process involving fingerprint scans and IAFIS’s criminal master file). 
175 Individuals exempt from fingerprint collection include diplomats, certain government officials, 
children under age fourteen, and persons over age eighty.  NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 
100, at 45.  Their photographs are then checked against photograph watch lists to combat visa fraud and 
catch wanted criminals or terrorists.  Id.   
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IV.  LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF NEVA AND THE  
COLLECTION OF BIOMETRIC DATA 
If enacted, NEVA would require the government to incorporate 
biometrics data into SEEVS and E-Verify and to collect biometric data 
from prospective workers.  This collection raises the same legal issues that 
arise when the government collects any information from its citizens: 
whether such collection constitutes a violation of a prospective worker’s 
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unwarranted and unreasonable 
searches and seizures.176  The Fourth Amendment gives “the people [the 
right] to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.”177  Just as the Fourth Amendment 
ordinarily requires that a police officer have a search warrant to search a 
dwelling, the Supreme Court has stated that “‘no less could be required 
where intrusions into the human body are concerned. . . .’”178  The Court 
has also noted that “a Fourth Amendment search occurs when the 
government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society 
recognizes as reasonable.”179  Because biometric technology involves 
collecting data from parts of an individual’s body and may reveal private 
medical information about the individual,180 the use of such technology 
could implicate the Fourth Amendment in two ways: (1) gathering 
biometric evidence may constitute an intrusion into—and therefore a 
Fourth Amendment search of—a person’s body; or (2) gathering biometric 
evidence may reveal private medical information, violating an established 
societal expectation of privacy. 
A.  Gathering Biometric Data Through E-Verify Does Not Appear To Be a 
Fourth Amendment Search 
The Supreme Court has held that fingerprinting is subject to the 
requirements of the Search and Seizure Clause of the Fourth 
Amendment.181  In Davis v. Mississippi, the Meridian, Mississippi police, 
                                                                                                                          
176 The United States Supreme Court has yet to address whether the collection of biometric data 
constitutes a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment.  The Court has ruled that detaining a 
suspect in a criminal investigation for the sole purpose of collecting fingerprints is a seizure under the 
Fourth Amendment.  Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 726 (1969).  Collection of biometric data 
through E-Verify, however, would not fall under the Davis ruling because the data would not be used 
for criminal investigatory purposes and the collection would not occur during a detainment.  
177 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (quoting the 
above text of the Fourth Amendment and noting that “‘[a]t the very core’ of the Fourth Amendment 
‘stands the right of a man to retreat into his home and there be free from unreasonable governmental 
intrusion’” (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961))). 
178 Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 761 (1985) (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 
(1966)). 
179 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)). 
180 See infra notes 232–37 and accompanying text. 
181 United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 4 (1973) (citing Davis, 394 U.S. at 724). 
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without warrants, detained at least twenty-four African American teenagers 
at police headquarters when a rape victim could only describe her assailant 
as a black youth.182  The police found fingerprints on the sill and borders of 
a window that the victim alleged the assailant had used to enter her 
home.183  The police detained the teenagers, questioned them, fingerprinted 
them, and released them without charge.184  Davis, who had previously 
worked as a “yard boy” for the victim, was eventually detained because a 
set of his fingerprints—and a second set taken after he was again detained 
overnight in jail in Jackson, Mississippi—matched the prints on the 
window.185  The police used the prints at Davis’s trial over his objection, 
and he was subsequently convicted of rape.186   
Because the fingerprints were captured during an illegal detention, the 
Court overturned Davis’s conviction, reasoning that “[d]etentions for the 
sole purpose of obtaining fingerprints are no less subject [than arrests] to 
the constraints of the Fourth Amendment.”187  The Court did note, 
however, that some narrowly-defined detentions without probable cause 
might comply with the Fourth Amendment.188  But the Court declined to 
determine whether “narrowly circumscribed [criminal investigation] 
procedures” for obtaining fingerprints without probable cause would meet 
Fourth Amendment requirements.189  
Although Davis put detentions for the sole purpose of collecting 
fingerprints for criminal investigation under the Fourth Amendment’s 
constitutional umbrella of protection against unreasonable searches, in the 
context of seeking employment, where the prospective worker is not 
detained and her fingerprints are not used for criminal investigation, the 
                                                                                                                          
182 Davis, 394 U.S. at 722. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. at 723. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. at 727.  The Court relied on this same precedent in Hayes v. Florida.  470 U.S. 811, 814 
(1985).  In that case, police went to the house of the alleged assailant and threatened to arrest him if he 
did not cooperate and go to the police station with them to be fingerprinted.  Id. at 812.  When the 
prints matched those at the crime scene, Hayes was subsequently arrested, charged, and convicted.  Id. 
at 813.  The Court held that there was no probable cause to arrest Hayes, that his fingerprints were 
taken without consent, and that, therefore, the fingerprints “were the inadmissible fruits of an illegal 
detention” in violation of the Fourth Amendment.  Id.  
188 Davis, 394 U.S. at 727. 
189 Id. at 728.  The Court noted that “[d]etention for fingerprinting may constitute a much less 
serious intrusion upon personal security than other types of police searches and detentions” because 
capturing fingerprints “involves none of the probing into an individual’s private life and thoughts that 
marks an interrogation or search.”  Id. at 727.  Because the police only need one set of prints, the 
detention could not be employed repeatedly to harass an individual, and because there is little danger of 
fingerprints being destroyed, the police could schedule the detention at a convenient time for the 
individual.  Id.  This dicta suggests that gathering fingerprints for the purpose of criminal investigation 
may not constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure in some instances, narrowing the Davis holding to, at 
the very least, the facts of that case.  Further, now that fingerprints can reveal medical information 
about an individual, taking images of them may implicate more than just identification.  
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Fourth Amendment likely would not apply.  In Davis, the state forced the 
defendant to record his fingerprints for its criminal investigation against 
him.  NEVA, however, does not force a prospective worker to give her 
fingerprints.  Rather, she would exchange them for the opportunity of 
employment.  Under this rationale, it is likely that a court would find that 
requiring an applicant to submit biometrics data for employment does not 
constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment. 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has already made a similar finding.  
In Trade Waste Management Ass’n v. Hughey,190 the Third Circuit upheld 
a New Jersey law that required prospective licensees to disclose 
information, including fingerprints, in order to obtain a license to dispose 
of solid and hazardous waste within the state.191  The law had been created 
to prevent organized crime from having ownership interests in the waste-
disposal industry.192  The fingerprints were taken from prospective 
licensees and then crosschecked with the state and the FBI criminal 
databases.193  The statute required that the state collect fingerprints from 
business owners, stockholders, or beneficiaries of company funds to 
them.194  The discovery of convictions of, or pending charges for, certain 
crimes would result in a denial of the company’s application.195   
The plaintiffs alleged that the fingerprinting requirement violated their 
constitutional right to privacy.196  The Third Circuit, however, found that 
the statute’s “fingerprinting requirement . . . .  [wa]s not involuntary in the 
[F]ourth [A]mendment sense.  It [wa]s required only as a condition for 
obtaining or keeping a license to engage in a business that the state may 
license.”197  Moreover, the State may compel disclosure of private 
information if its interest in such disclosure outweighs the individual’s 
privacy interests, and because the law was rationally related to the 
investigation of the licensees’ qualifications, which the court found to be a 
compelling governmental interest, the court upheld the law.198 
Just as the statutory scheme for the licensee program established in 
Trade Waste used fingerprints to prevent participants in organized crime 
from having ownership interests in the waste disposal industry, so too 
would NEVA utilize the same technology to create an applicant-filter 
program aimed at decreasing the “economic magnet” that draws illegal 
                                                                                                                          
190 780 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1985).  
191 Id. at 228, 239. 
192 Id. at 223. 
193 Id. at 228, 233. 
194 Id. at 224–25, 233. 
195 Id. at 225–26.  These crimes included murder, kidnapping, gambling, robbery, bribery, 
extortion, criminal usury, arson, burglary, theft, and other related crimes.  Id. 
196 Id. at 233. 
197 Id. at 234. 
198 Id. 
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immigrants into the United States.199  The legal principles of Trade Waste 
should also apply to SEEVS.  The requirement that prospective employees 
submit to fingerprint scans would not constitute a Fourth Amendment 
search because the fingerprints would be a condition precedent to obtaining 
employment.  Such a prerequisite to employment is not unlike requiring 
suspicionless drug-testing of employees who apply for promotions, which 
the Court has held is a reasonable Fourth Amendment search.200  Also, 
unlike in Davis or in Hayes, the government would not detain or 
fingerprint an applicant without consent.   
Likewise, SEEVS is rationally related to the government’s interest in 
securing national borders and discouraging illegal immigration.201  
Fingerprinting would simplify the process of determining whether an 
applicant is the person she claims, and would make it tougher for illegal 
immigrants to commit fraud, because it would be harder to copy and use a 
person’s fingerprint than it presently is to copy and use a person’s social 
security number.  The program would also relieve employers of the burden 
of determining whether a person resembles the picture presented on her 
legal documents, and it has the potential to alleviate errors that would only 
occur in a system based purely on name and numbers.202 
Like fingerprint collection, capturing iris images would also likely not 
constitute a Fourth Amendment search or seizure.203  The scan itself 
commits no more of an intrusion into the body than a fingerprint scan.  
Although the iris is a sub-dermal organ, the technology only measures and 
records what is visible through the cornea.204  The process of recognition 
appears less intrusive than a fingerprint scan to the user because, unlike 
fingerprint or palm recognition, the user does not have to place the part 
scanned on anything—she only needs to direct her eyes in a specified 
direction.205  Iris scans are also much less intrusive than retinal scans, 
                                                                                                                          
199 See Harper, supra note 5, at 4 (explaining that the “logic” Congress used in enacting the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act was to “reduce the strength of [the] country’s economic 
‘magnet’” by “making it illegal to hire an illegal immigrant”). 
200 Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 679 (1989). 
201 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.  
202 But see Feldman, supra note 143, at 663 (arguing that “[n]o biometric technique is completely 
accurate”).  Fingerprint scans could introduce new, complex error problems, and while generally 
reliable, they may be misread if the user puts her finger at a different angle or pressure than the 
fingerprint on file.  Id.  An automated finger scanner would be only as good as the humans who ran the 
system, and human error will undoubtedly still play a role in SEEVS.  Id. at 664. 
203 There are no federal cases that address the question of whether an iris scan would constitute a 
search under the Fourth Amendment.  
204 See WOODWARD, JR. ET AL., ARMY BIOMETRIC APPLICATIONS, supra note 99, at 17 (“Iris 
scanning measures the iris pattern in the colored part of the eye.”).  
205 Of course, no matter how intrusive the process of iris recognition actually is, undoubtedly the 
practice may feel more intrusive because the process carries a negative connotation, generated by 
Hollywood movies such as Minority Report and Demolition Man.  See Feldman, supra note 143, at 
660–61 n.43 (listing movies and television shows that have portrayed iris scans).  The American public 
may therefore erroneously believe that iris scanning impedes on the private sphere more than 
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which require measurements and copies of the veins contained inside the 
eye wall.206  As the technology advances, recognition should take less time 
and be accurate at longer distances.  
Unlike fingerprints or patterns around the eye, an individual’s facial 
features are exposed “regardless of the cooperation or compulsion of the 
owner.”207  Consequently, the Supreme Court has held that “facial scars, 
birthmarks, and other facial features” are “in plain view” and therefore are 
not protected by the Fourth Amendment.208  Moreover, according to the 
Second Circuit, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy as to the 
features on one’s face.209  It follows, then, that regardless of whether a 
person is wrongfully detained or not, an individual’s facial features will 
almost never be protected under the Fourth Amendment.  If SEEVS 
utilizes a facial recognition system, such a system should not fall within 
the purview of a Fourth Amendment search. 
B.  If Gathering Biometric Data Through E-Verify Is a “Search,” It Is a 
Minimal Intrusion to Prospective Workers and Involves a 
Governmental Interest Outweighing Any Privacy Interest 
Even if a court were to find that requiring an applicant to submit 
biometric data for employment constitutes a search under the Fourth 
Amendment, it may also find that a biometric submission would fall under 
one of two exceptions: (1) administrative searches; or (2) “special needs” 
searches. 
1.  The Administrative Search 
Administrative searches include inspections of closely-regulated 
businesses and extend to other routine regulatory investigations.210  For 
example, in New York v. Burger,211 the Court held that a business owner’s 
expectation of privacy is attenuated with respect to his commercial 
property, where the business is “closely regulated.”212  In that case, a 
                                                                                                                          
fingerprint collection, even though current reports suggest that that data is used no differently than 
fingerprint recognition.  See WOODWARD, JR. ET AL., ARMY BIOMETRIC APPLICATIONS supra note 99, 
at 26–27 (discussing a study, which suggests that managers of voluntary biometrics programs had no 
concern for stigma, but that managers in mandatory biometrics programs may have had some concern 
for stigma).  
206 See WOODWARD, JR. ET AL., ARMY BIOMETRIC APPLICATIONS, supra note 99, at 17 
(explaining the differences between iris scans and retinal scans). 
207 United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 27 (1973). 
208 See id. at 26 (citing United States v. Doe, 457 F.2d 895, 898 (2d Cir. 1972)) (noting that, in 
Davis, the Court held that fingerprints were protected by the Fourth Amendment, but that other courts 
have found that facial features do not receive the same protection). 
209 Doe, 457 F.2d at 898. 
210 See United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 823 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that “‘administrative’ 
searches . . . include[] inspections of closely-regulated businesses”). 
211 482 U.S. 691 (1987). 
212 Id. at 700. 
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warrantless search of a vehicle junkyard was upheld as reasonable because 
of the diminished privacy interest of the business owner in his commercial 
property and the state’s substantial interest in curbing automobile thefts.213   
If a court upheld E-Verify as an administrative search, that court would 
most likely find that the substantial governmental interest outweighed an 
individual’s privacy interest.  First, when a worker submits her personal 
information to an employer, she arguably has a lower expectation of 
privacy.  She surrenders her home address, social security number, driver’s 
license number, birth certificate information, and other identifying 
documents to her employer, the SSA, and the IRS.  Even if her information 
may never leave these agencies, the worker still subjects herself to a lower 
expectation of privacy.  Likewise, the government’s interest in preventing 
illegal employment increases substantially in the employer-employee 
context.214  Given the degree of intrusion from a scan of the finger, face, or 
iris, and the requirement of House Resolution 2028 that all biometric 
information collection comport with privacy legislation,215 such an analysis 
may very well fall against the worker. 
It is unlikely, however, that a court will find that the employer-
employee relationship and hiring process is a “closely regulated” business.  
House Resolution 2028 would expand to employers already participating 
in E-Verify, which include those not “closely regulated.”216  For an 
administrative search exception to apply, the business must be “closely 
regulated,” meaning “[c]ertain industries have such a history of 
government oversight that no reasonable expectation of privacy . . .  
exist[s] . . . .”217  To apply to the hiring process, a court would need to 
stretch the definition of “closely regulated” business beyond its historical 
context to incorporate a general business process.  One would also have to 
argue that the hiring process has a history of government oversight, which 
has created little or no expectation of privacy.  It is unlikely that such an 
argument would be successful. 
2.  “Special Needs” Searches 
Justice Blackmun established the “special needs” exception in New 
Jersey v. T.L.O.,218 which upheld the constitutionality of a school 
administrator’s search of a student’s purse after she had been observed 
smoking in a school restroom.219  After T.L.O., courts use the special needs 
                                                                                                                          
213 Id. at 713–14. 
214 See supra notes 7 and accompanying text. 
215 See supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text. 
216 H.R. 2028, 111th Cong. § 102(a)(2) (2009). 
217 New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 700 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
218 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
219 See id. at 347 (majority opinion) (stating that the administrator’s decision to open the student’s 
bag and “the search resulting in the discovery of the evidence of marihuana dealing” were reasonable). 
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doctrine to justify, in narrow contexts, searches made without a warrant or 
individualized suspicion based upon “a careful balancing of governmental 
and private interests.”220  The Court limits this test to “those exceptional 
circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law 
enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement 
impracticable.”221  For the special needs doctrine to apply, the primary 
purpose of a search conducted by a school official must constitute a special 
need beyond the normal need for law enforcement, and must outweigh the 
privacy interest at stake and the character of the intrusion.222   
A court may find that extracting biometric data to determine a 
prospective worker’s citizenship status would be a “special needs” search 
and therefore constitutionally permissible.  First, Congress has a strong 
interest in policing the national border.223  SEEVS’s purpose advances this 
interest because it should substantially decrease an individual’s chances of 
circumventing identification procedures and acquiring employment in the 
United States.224  Second, the character of the intrusion is minimal.  
Biometric automated systems may capture digital images of fingerprints 
and irises, but those images are stored in the form of an algorithm and are 
only used to compare with fresh data samples obtained by a user.  E-Verify 
would obtain biometric information for administrative purposes—
determining whether a prospective worker is hirable—and would not be 
used as a tool of law enforcement.  The biometric information would be 
compared to information in a database, and, when there is no match, the 
only consequence is a final nonconfirmation—the employer cannot legally 
hire the worker.225 
3.  “Totality of the Circumstances” Analysis 
The Supreme Court has recently expanded its Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence by using a “totality of the circumstances” test to assess the 
constitutionality of searches conducted without a warrant or individualized 
                                                                                                                          
220 Id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also Ric Simmons, Searching for Terrorists: Why 
Public Safety Is Not a Special Need, 59 DUKE L.J. 843, 863–64 (2010) (explaining that “[i]n his 
concurrence, Justice Blackmun set out a test that would be used in future cases”). 
221 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
222 See Simmons, supra note 220, at 864–865 (explaining that the Court later loosened the special 
needs doctrine to consider other factors such as expectation of privacy and the intrusiveness of the 
invasion). 
223 See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566–67 (1976) (finding that the 
government’s interest in conducting suspicionless fixed-checkpoint vehicle stops outweighed a private 
individual’s Fourth Amendment interests). 
224 See supra notes 129 and 143 and accompanying text. 
225 Note, however, that if the employer hires the worker, the worker may be detained if she is on 
the employer’s premises during a DHS raid.  See MEISSNER & ROSENBLUM, supra note 3, at 4 
(explaining how E-Verify works); Harper, supra note 5, at 5 (same). 
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suspicion.226  In United States v. Knights227 and Samson v. California,228 
the Court declined to undertake a special needs analysis and instead 
examined the “totality of the circumstances” of the search of a 
probationer’s apartment with only reasonable suspicion and the search of a 
parolee without any suspicion.229  Both searches under this lesser standard 
were found to be reasonable.230  Although the subject matter of these cases 
falls outside the scope of this Note, this expanded analysis is worth 
highlighting because it “has provided a new method to judge the Fourth 
Amendment constitutionality of government searches.”231  If a court 
employs a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis in determining whether 
NEVA’s biometric requirement constitutes a search, it is likely that the 
relatively non-invasive and brief nature of capturing biometric information 
would surmount the reasonableness threshold.  A court, however, has yet 
to use this analysis outside of the parolee-probationer search context.   
C.  Creating a Biometric Database Would Not Violate Privacy 
Expectations 
Unlike social security numbers, pin numbers, or passwords, biometrics 
may contain medical information about an individual.232  The iris or retina, 
for example, could reveal health conditions such as diabetes, 
arteriosclerosis, and hypertension.233  Certain studies have suggested a link 
between fingerprint patterns and homosexuality and that a number of 
chromosomal disorders can affect the patterns of ridges in the finger.234  
                                                                                                                          
226 Charles J. Nerko, Note, Assessing Fourth Amendment Challenges to DNA Extraction Statutes 
After Samson v. California, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 917, 926 (2008). 
227 See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121–22 (2001) (holding that a warrantless search 
of a probationer’s apartment, supported by reasonable suspicion and authorized by a condition of 
probation, was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment given the totality of the circumstances, and 
stating that “[a]lthough the Fourth Amendment ordinarily requires the degree of probability embodied 
in the term ‘probable cause,’ a lesser degree satisfies the Constitution when the balance of 
governmental and private interests makes such a standard reasonable”). 
228 See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 852, 857 (2006) (holding that a suspicionless search 
of a parolee did not violate the Fourth Amendment and that the “totality of the circumstances” must be 
examined to determine whether a search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment). 
229 Nerko, supra note 226, at 926–27. 
230 Id. at 926–28. 
231 Id. at 930. 
232 See WOODWARD, JR. ET AL., ARMY BIOMETRIC APPLICATIONS, supra note 98, at 30 (stating 
that “[b]ecause biometrics are inherent to the individual, researchers are likely to try to link medical 
predispositions, behavioral types, or other characteristics to particular biometric patterns”); see also 
Woodward, Biometric Scanning, supra note 115, at 115–17 (arguing that biometric scanning may 
prompt various legal and policy concerns because it may incidentally capture information about 
individuals’ medical history). 
233 Woodward, Biometric Scanning, supra note 115, at 115. 
234 See, e.g., P.E. Natekar & F.M. DeSouza, Digital Dermatoglyphics in Leprosy, 9 
ANTHROPOLOGIST 63, 65 (2007) (discussing the results of a study that revealed leprosy may affect the 
development of fingerprint ridges); Christopher Hernandez, Sexuality Is Genetic, Professor Argues, 
DAILY PRINCETONIAN, Oct. 12, 2006, available at http://www.dailyprincetonian.com 
/2006/10/12/16168/ (stating that “researchers . . . have examined fingerprint patterns, hypothalamus 
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Should such information be disclosed when a user submits biometric 
information, it would likely implicate a societal expectation of privacy and 
constitute a “search” under the Katz doctrine. 
Current technology is not capable of disclosing private medical 
information from the biometric data collected.235  Existing biometric 
systems do not observe biometric data as a human would, but rather 
“translate information into a mathematical construction that has no 
physiological meaning.”236  For such capabilities to exist, it would most 
likely require a huge shift in the concept of biometric scanning 
technology.237  Only then will those concerns be addressed. 
Even if SEEVS could reveal private medical information about a user, 
NEVA requires that all biometric data collected be encrypted and 
segregated from the worker’s identifying information unless the worker 
requests otherwise.238  SEEVS must also conform to existing privacy 
laws.239  NEVA gives the worker the right to cancel enrollment at anytime 
after the authentication process is over.240  When requested, the 
cancellation removes the worker’s biometric information from SEEVS 
without prejudice.241 
Some courts allow storage of other kinds of information.  For example, 
several circuit courts have upheld the collection and storage of DNA 
samples from convicts as reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.242  In 
                                                                                                                          
size, the size differential between the second and fourth digit of the hand, pheromones and even the 
sexuality of sheep”). 
235 See Feldman, supra note 143, at 667 (explaining that “[i]t would take a significant 
technological shift . . . to go from current biometric systems to systems that reveal disease or other 
health information”). 
236 Id.  Retinal scans, for example, do not take images of the retina.  Instead, they scan the retina 
in a circle to create a one-dimensional pattern, which is then compared to other patterns contained in a 
database.  Id.  Likewise, fingerprint scans are not based on direct comparisons of the images of 
fingerprints.  The system measures the arches and patterns of the fingers and formulates an algorithm, 
which it then uses to determine if a fingerprint matches any print stored in the database.  See 
WOODWARD, JR. ET AL., ARMY BIOMETRIC APPLICATIONS, supra note 99, at 16 (explaining that no 
print of the finger is taken and that fingerprint sensors measure the spatial geometry of the finger). 
237 Feldman, supra note 143, at 667. 
238 H.R. 2028, 111th Cong. § 103(b)(2)(D) (2009). 
239 Id. § 103(c)(3). 
240 Id. § 103(b)(4)(C). 
241 Id. 
242 See United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 177 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that “under Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness standard for analyzing the constitutionality of government searches and 
seizures, the collection of DNA samples from individuals on supervised release is constitutional”); 
United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 839 (9th Cir. 2004) (concluding that “compulsory DNA 
profiling of qualified federal offenders is reasonable under the totality of the circumstances”); United 
States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1146 (10th Cir. 2003) (finding that “[t]he DNA Act, while implicating 
the Fourth Amendment, is a reasonable search and seizure under the special needs exception to the 
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement because the desire to build a DNA database goes beyond the 
ordinary law enforcement need”); Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding that a 
“reasoned interpretation of the ‘special needs’ doctrine support[ed] the constitutionality” of a 
Connecticut statute that required, prior to the release of persons convicted of certain crimes, the 
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those cases, the courts found that the government’s substantial interest in 
collecting DNA samples from convicts, parolees, and probationers 
outweighed the very limited expectation of privacy that a convict, parolee, 
or probationer might have.243  Although the government’s interest in 
collecting biometric information from prospective workers is arguably less 
than its interest in collecting DNA samples from convicts, so too is 
NEVA’s method of collection.  In those cases, the government was 
collecting blood and tissue samples, while E-Verify would simply scan the 
image of a worker’s fingerprint or iris.  Because NEVA’s method of 
collection is substantially less intrusive than that required by the DNA Act, 
a court, using the totality-of-the-circumstances test, could conclude it is a 
reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Biometrics presents a practical solution to the large gaps that plague a 
crucial step in the worker verification process, namely, whether a worker is 
who she claims to be.  Given enough resources, E-Verify has the potential 
to dramatically decrease the “employment magnet” that purportedly draws 
illegal immigrants into the United States.  First, defrauders will find it 
more difficult to imitate biometric information.  While biometrics will 
undoubtedly not end employment fraud, it will substantially discourage the 
majority of defrauders, who are capable of undermining existing 
verification procedures, and increase the security of personal identification.  
Second, biometrics will also relieve the employer’s burden of on-the-spot 
worker identity verification.  Instead of comparing document images of the 
worker with the person presenting them, an employer need only use 
SEEVS’s biometric option to legally comply with NEVA.  Third, because 
a biometric scan likely would not constitute a search under the 
Constitution, mandating SEEVS would not implicate Fourth Amendment 
protections.  Existing technological capabilities and NEVA’s privacy 
compliance requirement would ensure a worker’s constitutional privacy; 
personal identity would not be compromised, while still maintaining a high 
level of accuracy.   
Before Congress can employ such a system, however, several concerns 
must be addressed.  Biometrics is still prone to human mistake and abuse.  
The current E-Verify infrastructure, which was created for a small 
voluntary program, would strain under a national mandate that would draw 
in millions of new employers and workers.  Americans are also likely to 
disapprove of a biometrics requirement because of the stigma associated 
                                                                                                                          
collection of blood for “DNA . . . analysis to determine identification characteristics specific to the 
person”).  
243 Sczubelek, 402 F.3d at 177; Kincade, 379 F.3d at 839; Kimler, 335 F.3d at 1146; Marcotte, 193 
F.3d at 79–80. 
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with the government’s use of the technology and ignorance of its 
limitations.  If it hopes to successfully implement any biometrics recording 
regime, Congress first needs to educate the public on the technology’s 
capabilities, and the system’s weaknesses and rates of error would have to 
be mitigated.  No doubt, a biometric employment verification system will 
require cooperation and patience from employers and workers, but it has 
the potential to significantly curb an illegal worker’s ability to gain 
employment within the United States.   
 
